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RESILIENCY, ADAPTATION, AND THE
UPSIDES OF EX POST LAWMAKING*
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN*

Although the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of many states
and foreign countries properly prohibitex post facto lawmaking in the
criminal context, the practice takes place quite regularly in other
settings. This Essay argues that there are numerous reasons for this
phenomenon, including the need for a resilient legal system to be able
to respond to those who game the law through practices known as
"regulatoryarbitrage."
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INTRODUCTION

At first blush, it is hard to imagine having anything nice to say

about legal institutions making law retroactively. It was to prohibit
after-the-fact criminalization that the Framers drafted the two ex post
facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution, in Sections 9 and 10 of Article

I, one of the nation's first restrictions on both federal and state levels
of government.' The constitutions of many states contain similar
@ 2011 Donald T. Hornstein.
Aubrey L. Brooks Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law. Thanks to Erin Deignan Reis and Shahid Khan for outstanding research
assistance; to Victor Flatt and Maria Savasta-Kennedy for co-conceiving the symposium
on resiliency and adaptation in legal systems; and to the staff of the North Carolina Law
Review for their professionalism in hosting the symposium in October 2010. All errors in
this paper, of course, are my own.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.") (prohibition on the federal government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No
State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ") (prohibition on state governments). See generally Burgess
v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878) ("An ex post facto law is one which imposes a
punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or a
punishment in addition to that then prescribed.").
*
**
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provisions,2 and the sentiment is consistently, if not perfectly, echoed
across the constitutions of countries as diverse as Brazil, Indonesia,
and Norway.' Even as to civil law, Thomas Jefferson once opined
about government acting "against natural right" when it declares the
law after the fact: "[T]he omission of a caution which would have
been right, does not justify the doing what is wrong."'
It may be surprising, therefore, to learn that retroactive
lawmaking is, in fact, neither uncommon nor undefended. Speaking
of the Supreme Court's tradition of applying new interpretations of
the Constitution to decide cases already before it, Harvard law
professor Steven Smith recounts Justice Souter's observation that
retroactive applications are "overwhelmingly the norm,"' as well as
Justice Scalia's argument that retroactive applications are
constitutionally required because the Court can only decide what the
law "is."' Less metaphysically,' it is a regular practice in virtually all
common law courts to apply "retroactively" newly announced legal
2. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11 ("No ex post facto law ... shall be passed by
the general assembly."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Retrospective laws, punishing acts
committed before the existence of such laws and by them only declared criminal, are
oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty, and therefore no ex post facto law shall
be enacted."). See generally Neil Colman McCabe & Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto
Provisionsof State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONsT. L. 133 (1991) (including
a survey of ex post facto provisions in state constitutions).
3. CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XL (Braz.), translated in
3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 5 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp.
2011) ("[T]he penal law shall not be retroactive, except to the benefit of the defendant.");
CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Chapter XA, art. 281(1), translated in 9
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 15-16 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp.
2011) ("[T]he right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect ... cannot be
limited under any circumstances."); CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY, art. 97, translated in 14
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 19 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Supp.
2011) ("No law must be given retroactive effect."); see also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 11 (Dec. 10, 1948),
available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index ("No one shall be held guilty of
any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
offense, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: DEFINITIVE EDITION 326, 327 (Albert Ellery Bergh
ed., 1907).
5. STEVEN SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 62 (2004).
6. Id.
7. The reference to the metaphysics of retroactivity is intended as a paean to a recent
book that is both important and charming, Law's Quandary, by Harvard law professor
Steven Smith. The "quandary" is the tension between, on the one hand, the nearmetaphysical presumption behind retroactivity that the law is "there" to be discovered and
declared and, on the other hand, the modern notion of law as a purely positivist enterprise
launched by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous lecture on The Path of the Law.
SMITH, supra note 5, at 44-51.
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principles to the disputes at bar in myriad tort, property, or contract
cases.' For over half a century in federal administrative law, since the
Supreme Court's 1947 opinion in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,' it cannot
even be contested that federal agencies may announce new principles
of law retroactively in adjudications rather than prospectively in
rulemakings. 10 And, in the legal academy, there exists an especially
robust literature on legal transitions and the question of retroactive
applications of new law that inheres in them.n
The surprising persistence of retroactivity is, however, only the
starting point for this Essay. The larger inquiry tests the link between
retroactivity and the twin properties of resiliency and adaptation in
legal systems, the subject matter of this symposium. My central theme
is that it is precisely this link that often explains retroactivity's
persistence. After laying out in Part I some general observations
about resiliency and adaptation in legal systems, I explore in Part II
those places in the law where retroactivity is not only tolerated but
sometimes celebrated. In Part III, I make the descriptive claim that
retroactivity is often accepted precisely when the law is faced with
questions of resiliency and adaptive capacity. And I sketch-and
endorsel 2-the normative case for retroactivity when such questions
8. See Timothy A. Baughman, Justice Moody's Lament Unanswered: Michigan's
UnprincipledRetroactivity Jurisprudence,79 MICH. B. J. 664, 665 (2000) ("[A]n overruling

that is wholly prospective, applying not even in the case before the Court, is at least
arguably beyond the authority of the Court, as it does not resolve any 'case.' "); Bradley
Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 839 (2003) ("It is an unavoidable implication of the
adjudicative function that the cases considered by courts almost invariably involve conduct
or events that occurred in the past. This means that the resolution of the legal issues
virtually always involves the 'retroactive' application of some controlling rule of law, at
least in the sense that the determination of which law to apply to past conduct or past
events is ordinarily post hoc."). Indeed, even in some criminal cases, most notably those
involving sex offenders, retroactivity has occasionally been allowed. See Wayne A. Logan,
The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudenceof Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1261, 1269-75 (1998) (addressing the Supreme Court's upholding of Kansas's Sexually
Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), which imposed an
indefinite period of involuntary civil confinement upon a convicted sex offender less than
one month before he was due to be released from prison).
9. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
10. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921,921-26 (1965).
11. See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF TRANSITON RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 25-27 (2000); Michael Graetz,

Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1821-26 (1985); Kenneth Kress, Legal
Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear
Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 377-402 (1984); Saul Levmore, Changes,
Anticipations,and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1657-62 (1999).
12. With some qualifications, see infra Part III.
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are on the line. In particular, I argue that ex post lawmaking is
valuable in two types of situations: when governments are faced with
unforeseen events, and especially when governments are faced with
"dynamic noncompliance," situations when previously announced
rules spawn strategic behavior that seeks to game the law through
novel mechanisms that would otherwise straddle the law's letter while
unquestionably violating its purpose.
I. RESILIENCY AND ADAPTATION AS SYSTEMS PROPERTIES

I begin by noting that neither resiliency nor adaptation is an
unalloyed good. One can imagine a resilient legal system that returns
to roots that are merely path dependent to begin with 3 or, worse, a
resilient system based on suspect or even despised intellectual
foundations. The resiliency of the slave property system in the
antebellum South comes to mind. 4 Similarly, there is such a thing as
too much adaptivity. Economist Kenneth Arrow's impossibility
theorem15 is a case in point, explaining situations in which a majoritybased political system can devolve into periods of endless cycling of
unstable, temporary majorities-threatening any associated system of
majority-based laws with bleak prospects for consistency over time or
anything resembling a stable rule of law. Along the same lines, the
value of adaptation presupposes a reference point, "adaptive to
what?" Thus, a legal system so adaptive that it allows legal "rights" to
be regularly subordinated to the wishes of the powerful might so
often undermine the system's normative precommitments to justice
and individual rights that the system's adaptivity becomes one of its
greatest weaknesses.
These caveats noted, I take the central problem of this
symposium to be the responsiveness of legal systems to various types
13. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641, 643-63 (1996) (explaining path dependence of comparative corporate and
bankruptcy laws in the United States and Japan).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACr: THE
RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 238-81 (1989) (describing the persistence of
southern slavery despite almost 100 years of various forms of antislavery campaigns).
15. Arrow's theorem posits situations in which disaffected voters who lose a plurality
vote on an issue can soon thereafter reframe issues into winning pluralities, only thereafter
to themselves become subject to similarly formed new winning combinations, and so on,
through endless periods of legislative "cycling." See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-39 (1991)
(introducing Arrow's theorem and noting that a summary of Arrow's work is found in
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 384-99 (1989)); id. at 39 ("Arrow's Theorem
presents a conceptual barrier to combining individual preferences into some overall
measure of social welfare.").
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of unwanted surprises-especially including such exogenous shocks to
the body politic as financial crises or environmental disasters, the
subjects of many of the symposium's fine papers-in which the
properties of resilience and adaptation are intuitively good things.
From this starting point, it is no surprise that symposium participants
borrow working definitions of resilience and adaptation from the
natural and social sciences where these properties are viewed as
valuable, even central, system qualities.16 Thus, from this literature,
Professor J.B. Ruhl provides us with an excellent, working definition
of resilience: " 'the capacity of a system to experience shocks while
retaining essentially the same function, structure, feedbacks, and
therefore identity.' "1 And building on this definition, Professor Ruhl
suggests a similar working definition of adaptation from the concept
of "adaptive capacity"s in the natural and social sciences, to mean
"[t]he idea that a system might sense threats to system equilibrium
and respond by changing resilience strategies without changing
fundamental

attributes

... ."9

These

definitions

established,

Professor Ruhl, as is customary with his fine body of work on systems
theory2 0 and the law, 21 then fleshes out the complex interplay between

16. See, e.g., Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for SocialEcological Systems Analyses, 16 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 253, 254 (2006)
(" '[R]esilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a
measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving
variables, and parameters, and still persist.' " (quoting C.S. Holling, Resilience and
Stability of EcologicalSystems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1, 17 (1973))).
17. J.B. Ruhl, GeneralDesign Principlesfor Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems - with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76
(2011) (quoting Brian Walker et al., A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositionsfor
Understanding Resilience in Social-EcologicalSystems, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (June 2006),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/ volll/issl/artl3).
18. Adaptive capacity has been defined as "an ability to become adapted (i.e., to be
able to live and to reproduce) to a certain range of environmental contingencies." Gilberto
C. Gallopm, Linkages Between Vulnerability, Resilience, and Adaptive Capacity, 16
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 293, 300 (2006).
19. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 1388.
20. Systems theory is "the transdisciplinary study of the abstract organization of
phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence.
It investigates both the principles common to all complex entities, and the (usually
mathematical) models which can be used to describe them." Francis Heylighen & Cliff
Joslyn, What is Systems Theory?, PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA WEB (Nov. 1, 1992),
http://pespmcl.vub.ac.be/systheor.html.
21. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Lawand-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (utilizing the scientific method to explain
the complex interactions between law and society); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart
and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91
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resilience and adaptation, including situations where the two concepts
can operate in tandem to preserve a system's identity in the face of
outside shocks, as well as situations where the two concepts can war
against each other.2 2 He does so by introducing such other features of
systems thinking as reliability, scalability, modularity, and
evolvability.
In my Essay, I am grateful for Professor Ruhl's core definitions
of resiliency and adaptation and am happy to use them as jumping off
points. In Parts II and III, I explore how these notions in fact shed
light on the law's surprisingly robust tolerance of ex post lawmaking.
But, that said, I otherwise do not attempt to fit my conclusions within
Professor Ruhl's broader systems perspective. This is because there is
still a great deal of difficulty (at least for me) in mapping systems
theories, premised on their own internally coherent nomenclature
and properties, onto legal systems, which are typically judged by
distinct sets of economic and social criteria.24
Thus, for example, under Professor Ruhl's conceptual lexicon, a
systems approach might describe an "unmistakable flip" from one
"equilibrium state to another" when the environmental law system
changed in the 1970s from one based on common law doctrines such
as nuisance law to one based on more proactive and comprehensive

GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) (exploring the problem of "regulatory accretion" in the
administrative state).
22. E.g., Ruhl, supra note 17, at 1389 ("Indeed, an overly strong design focus on
adaptability can undermine resilience. Optimizing the system to adapt to a particular set of
disturbances could potentially decrease resilience to unknown disturbances.").
23. Id. at 1385 (quoting David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of
Complexity and Their Implications for Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN & CYBERNETICS 839, 840 (2010)). "Scalability" can
mean how well a system is able to adapt to increased demands, or how well a solution to a
problem can work when the size of the problem increases. Scalability Definition,
DICrIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scalability (last visited Apr. 29,
2011). "[M]odularity ... is widely seen as one of the central principles of evolvability. The
idea is that modular organization favors evolvability by allowing one module to change
without interfering with the rest of the organism." Thomas F. Hansen, Is Modularity
Necessary for Evolvability? Remarks on the Relationship Between Pleiotropy and
Evolvability, 69 BIOSYSTEMS 83, 84 (2003). "Evolvability" is defined as "the ability of
random variations to sometimes produce improvement." Gunter P. Wagner & Lee
Altenberg, Perspectives: Complex Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability, 50
EVOLUTION 967, 967 (1996).
24. And I say this as someone who, like Professor Ruhl, has attempted to do exactly
that. See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law,
54 DUKE L.J. 913, 916 (2005) ("Part I of this Article considers whether theories of
adaptation, especially those found in the complexity theory literature, might add value
descriptively to legal doctrines, institutions, and analytic tools.").
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statutory/administrative structures? As a matter of historical
understanding, I find this observation both accurate and very useful.
But at the level of regulatory design, which I believe is the context in
which we are exploring resiliency and adaptation, I have a harder
time making the observation tractable. For example, are we to
conclude that the modern regulatory system of, say, protecting
endangered species, has actually worked, and, if so, how are we to
reconcile this new system with the species-extinction crisis that has
accelerated in the forty years since the "flip" (by which I mean,
despite the flip)?26 Which parts of the new system have worked, and
which have not? I simply have a hard time connecting the various
attributes of scalability, modularity, evolvability, and the like, into a
prescriptive framework in which I have more confidence than the
traditional touchstones of conventional legal analysis, such as
collective-action problems, conflicting social norms, lack of
incentives, and special-interest rent-seeking.
For the same reasons, I am politely declining Professor Ruhl's
invitation to situate my thoughts about resilience and adaptation
strongly within the borders of "new governance" theory, which he
describes as fashioning "new model[s] of collaborative, multi-party,
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving" governance.27 In doing so, I
emphasize that I am hostile neither to the sentiment behind such
institutional experimentation, nor to the periodic proposals for new
solutions that are made under the new governance banner.28 I am
simply confessing that I am not yet a true believer.

25. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 1384.
26. See, e.g., Craig Hilton-Taylor et al., State of the World's Species, in WILDLIFE IN A
CHANGING WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES 15, 15 (Jean-Chrisophe Vi6 et al. eds., 2009), available at http://data.iucn.org/
dbtw-wpdledocs/RL-2009-001.pdf ("[T]he Living Planet Index which monitors population
trends in 1,686 animal species shows an overall decline of 30% for the period 1970 to 2005
and the increasing rates of extinction of both described and undescribed species [are] a
direct and indirect result of human activities.") (citation omitted); Letter from Julia
Marton-Lefbvre, Dir. Gen., Int'l Union for Conservation of Nature, to Ministers of the
Environment 1 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/
letter to ministerscbdscopQ0final.pdf
("Biodiversity
loss
is
continuing
at
unprecedented rates and urgent action is needed to ensure the resilience of people and
nature, and to avoid catastrophic tipping points.").
27. Ruhl, supra note 17, at 1397 (quoting Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance"
in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004)).
28. See Hornstein, supra note 24, at 948 ("At least as framed by their original
developers, these projects genuinely seek to improve the quality of regulatory
decisionmaking.").
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Five years ago, I participated in a symposium at Duke Law
School, on "Incrementalism and the Administrative State," that
shared some intellectual overlap with this symposium on resiliency
and adaptation. There, two giants in environmental law sometimes
associated with the new governance school, Jody Freeman and Dan
Farber, used an example of a new breed of "modular" environmental
regulation, an experimental entity known as "CaFed."29 This
example of new governance was presented as a "model of creative
pragmatism" matched in scope with the broad dimensionality of
natural resource management in the San Francisco Bay Delta region,
thereby bringing the regulatory advantages of both "modularity" and
"scalability" to the problem."o Although Freeman and Farber were
careful to note problems in CalFed's design," there was an
unmistakable air of hope in their treatment of its prospects.32 Yet,
CalFed has since been regarded as a failure.33 Indeed, Professor Ruhl,
himself, recently added to the postmortems: "[T]he CalFed approach
is too dependent on faith that 'regulatory brilliance' will emerge from
the strongly coordinated collective entity."' Thus, although I have
nothing but admiration for the intellectual pioneers who are
attempting to theorize new governance, I am not yet confident that
we have a tractable systems theory with which to propose entirely
new breeds of legal institutions more resilient and adaptive than our
current ones.
However, using Professor Ruhl's core definitions of resiliency
and adaptation, which focus on the ability of legal systems to respond
to "shocks," I am willing to suggest at least a weaker connection
between ex post lawmaking and the broader new governance project.
To the extent new governance depends on institutions that proceed
incrementally, evolving (and changing) legal rules based on trial and
error, then these institutions will face many of the same conceptual
29. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular EnvironmentalRegulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795, 837-76 (2005) (case study of CalFed).
30. Id. On the failure of CalFed despite its promise as an example of creative
pragmatism, see Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and
Fall of CALFED, 37 ENvTL. L. 1145, 1195-1208 (2007).
31. Freeman & Farber, supra note 29, at 866-76.
32. Id. at 866 ("For all of these reasons, CalFed deserves a significant amount of
credit."); id. at 876 ("Yet despite its imperfections, and regardless of its future, CalFed has
already provided a powerful illustration of what we think of as modular environmental
regulation.").
33. See Owen, supra note 30, at 1195-1208.
34. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems
in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 59, 115 (2010)
(citing Owen, supra note 30, at 1215).
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challenges of (un)predictability and unsettling of expectations that
underlie objections to retroactivity generally. Thus, to the extent
retroactivity can be defended from such critiques because of the
resilience and adaptiveness it offers, the defense may add support to
the types of regulatory designs often propounded by new governance
scholars.
II. RESILIENCY, LEGAL TRANSITIONS, AND CHENERYH

If, as proposed above, retroactive lawmaking makes the law
more resilient and adaptive to previously unforeseen "shocks," then
theories of resiliency can shed light on the law's surprisingly robust
tolerance of ex post facto lawmaking. As a starting point, despite the
firm prohibition in the Constitution's ex post facto clauses against
retroactivity in the criminal law, the Supreme Court has not extended
those protections to governmental actions outside of the criminal law.
In one of its earliest decisions, the 1798 opinion in Calder v. Bull," the
Court held that the clauses were not "inserted to secure the citizen in
his private rights, of either property, or contracts ... [but rather] to

secure the person of the subject [only] from injury, or punishment, in
consequence of such law."36 Thirty years later, the Court reiterated its
Calder holding, rejecting a retroactivity challenge to a state property
measure,37 despite a dissenting opinion explicitly challenging the
historical conclusions reached by the Calder Court.38 The Calder
holding has been "rigorously followed" since its inception. 9
This hardly means, however, that broader problems with
retroactivity have not been raised in areas outside of the criminal law.
Although common law courts routinely apply newly announced
principles of tort, contract, and property law to the disputes before
them (a type of retroactivity),' they sometimes choose not to upset
35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
36. Id. at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.).
37. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413-14 (1829) (rejecting
challenge to a law changing relationship of owner and tenant of real property); Harold J.
Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84
GEO. L.J. 2143, 2153-54 (1996) (discussing the Court's "restrictive reading of the Ex Post
Facto Clause" and subsequent adherence to that standard).
38. Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 681-87 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (challenging the
historical foundations of the Court's holding in Calder); see also Krent, supra note 37, at
2154 (citing Justice Johnson's claim that the "far sounder view was that the clause applied
to civil as well as criminal matters").
39. Krent, supra note 37, at 2154.
40. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1734-35 (1991) ("In its 1982
decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that officials sued in
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existing expectations absent action from legislatures.4 1 Although
federal courts reviewing economic legislation under the Due Process
Clause require merely that Congress meet minimum standards of
rationality,42 the somewhat more searching inquiries under the
Takings Clause can be understood as addressing the associated
retroactivity problems that same legislation may cause when it unduly
upsets reasonable investment-backed expectations.4 3 Professor
Frederick Schauer notes that the ubiquity of questions attending the
fairness of legal transitions have so split into two literatures and
subliteratures-"one dealing with taxation, tort liability, and
occasionally the takings of property; the other dealing with rules,

constitutional tort actions generally are immune from damages liability unless their
conduct violated 'clearly established' law. The Harlow Court hardly invented qualified
immunity, but it did reshape the doctrine so that, for the first time, officials are shielded
from damages liability whenever the plaintiff relies on 'new' law."); Christopher Serkin,
Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1222
(2009) ("Various land use doctrines-from zoning to the vested rights doctrine to
amortization rules for prior nonconforming uses-assume that the government cannot
eliminate existing uses without paying compensation."); Richard E. Speidel, Contract
Excuse Doctrineand Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 795,
795 ("Law, whether by legislation, regulation, or judicial decision, changes over time.
Sometimes the change is totally prospective and has no effect on contracts entered before
the legislation's effective date. In other cases, the change has some retrospective effect,
ranging from ex post invalidation from the date of the contract, to impairment of future
performance under an existing contract. In these latter cases, the new law, even if
prospective in application, may have explicit or implicit retrospective effect in that future
contract performance is made illegal, prevented, hindered, or made more expensive by the
subsequent government act.").
41. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of
the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.").
42. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729
(1984) ("Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such
legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches
..... ); Usery v. Turney Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("[L]egislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption
of constitutionality, and ... the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.").
43. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (holding that a
landowner's investment in dredging a pond to make it navigable was an interest
"sufficiently important [that] the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes
over the management of the landowner's property"); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (finding "the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations ... [to be a] relevant consideration[]").

2011]

UPSIDES OF EX POST LAWMAKING

1559

precedents, reasons, and the other devices of legal stability"-that
they rarely engage with each other."
Yet in this Essay I seek specifically to address the role in
regulatory design that retroactive policymaking might contribute to
the law's resilience and adaptiveness. And there are two areas of
regulatory design where questions of retroactivity most often arise.
The first is captured by what is known as the "standards versus rules"
debate, the second in what is known in administrative law as the
Chenery II doctrine. After briefly describing the first, most of my
argumentation is located in the Chenery II doctrine of policymaking
ex post by administrative agencies in adjudications.
The literature on rules and standards is enormous, and
longstanding. In one of the classics in the field, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication," Professor Duncan Kennedy referenced a
thick "jurisprudence of rules" that analyzes two fundamentally
different types of legal solutions to societal problems: "One formal
mode favors the use of clearly defined, highly administrable, general
rules; the other supports the use of equitable standards producing ad
hoc decisions with relatively little precedential value."" The
difference between rules and standards has been illustrated with
simple examples, such as a speed limit of "65 miles-per-hour" being a
"rule" as opposed to the more general admonition, "drive carefully,"
being a "standard."47 It has also been captured by metaphors, such as
the difference between "crystal and mud."" But these descriptions
belie the rich literature that captures debates over the range of
criteria by which rules versus standards can be judged49 as well as the

44. Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261, 265 (2003). Schauer attempts to explain this split by
conjecturing that "jurisprudential transition literature, which considers the desirability of
change to be its major focus, and the taxation/torts/takings transition literature, which
takes the change as a given ... have focused on different stages of the larger transition
process, or on different actors in that process." Id. at 266.
45. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1685,1685 (1976).
46. Id.
47. Hans-Bernd Schafer, Rules Versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise
Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, 14 S. Cr. ECON.
REV. 113, 116 (2006).
48. See id. (citing Carole M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577, 577-604 (1988)).
49. Compare Kennedy, supra note 45, at 1685-86 (suggesting the normative difference
between rules and standards reduces to fundamental philosophical disagreements between
the relative values of "individualism" and "altruism," refracted through "a hundred and
fifty years of moral, economic, and political dispute"), with Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
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range of arguments about the relative desirability of rules versus
standards in particular situations. 0 For our purposes, though, one of
the most salient differences between the two is that rules are typically
viewed as specifying how law applies ahead of time (ex ante), whereas
standards explain how law applies to particular behavior only after
the conduct has occurred (ex post)." The use of standards, therefore,
raises retroactivity issues.
The rules versus standards debate spills over into a debate over
competing procedural approaches to generating law, a debate
captured in a parallel (and equally longstanding) literature on the
relative virtues of "rulemaking" and "adjudication."" Generally
speaking, this literature does not so much chronicle a "debate" as it
records a well-recognized shift away from adjudication and toward
rulemaking as the preferred process by which to create law.' At an
instrumental level, this shift can be seen in the increasing importance
to countless fields of law of statutes and statutory/regulatory regimes
in lieu of the older case-by-case adjudicatory approach of common
law courts-the sort of "flips" Professor Ruhl describes in this
symposium as that which occurred in the 1970s in federal
environmental law. 5 At a jurisprudential level, the shift to
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992) (applying standard
economic criterion of efficiency to determine the relative merits of rules versus standards).
50. Kaplow, supra note 49, at 568-85.
51. Id. at 559-60. The rules versus standards debate is, among other things, about the
difference between "ex ante versus ex post creation of the law." Id. at 562.
52. To be clear, the use of standards does not raise a retroactivity "problem." The
literature on rules versus standards includes arguments that it is precisely this element of
nonclarity ex ante that give standards one of their more defensible normative virtues. See,
e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay: Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional
Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1216-17 (2010) (explaining that standards,
because they are "fuzzy," are more likely to encourage moral deliberation among those
within the penumbra of the standard than are clear rules that already demarcate areas of
good and bad behavior).
53. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of PolicymakingForm, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1383-86 (2004); Glen 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 508-36 (1970); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 921-26; Peter L. Strauss,
Rules, Adjudication, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on
the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231,
1244-64 (1974).
54. E.g., Magill, supra note 53, at 1403-04 n.69 ("To say that there was a debate,
however, implies more diversity of opinion than can be found in that literature.... [T]he
drift of these articles [in administrative law scholarship] was fairly uniform: agencies
should use rulemaking more often than they did.").
55. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-3 (1982);
Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment,
Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 939, 994-95 (2000) ("Common law
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rulemaking may also have reflected the triumph of legal positivism as
an explanation of the legal enterprise, replacing the idea that courts
apply "the law," ethereal truths discoverable by judges, with the idea
that the law was entirely a product of human invention and thus every
bit within the analytical province of legislators, regulators, and
experts of various kinds. 6 At an epistemological level, the triumph of
rulemaking also reflected the growing conviction that the world was
better understood and policy better made through the analytical
approach of "comprehensive rationality," by which goals and means
would be fully specified, compared, and chosen synoptically via
techniques such as formal decision theory or cost-benefit analysis, as
opposed to a world view shaped "incrementally" through a pattern of
case-by-case experimentation and adjustment." Rulemaking was
associated with comprehensive rationality, adjudication with
incrementalism.5 1 And, because rulemaking would produce rules ex
ante, it added important procedural advantages over adjudication,
such as greater opportunities for democratic participation in the
formulation of the law, more transparency, and greater clarity ahead
of time about what sort of behavior was acceptable." Adjudication,
because it occurred after the fact and in a setting where only the
conduct of particular individuals or organizations was at stake, had
none of these advantages.6 Moreover, because policy announced in
adjudication occurred ex post, it provided little guidance ahead of

courts create new torts, as well as apply and modify existing torts, in the exercise of their
common law powers. It has always been so.... In the Age of Statutes, it is not surprising
that courts now create new torts out of statutory duties. Nearing v. Weaver recognized a
new tort where police agencies failed to perform a statutory duty to enforce domestic
relations restraining orders. Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern recognized a new tort for
serving tavern customers who were 'visibly intoxicated,' in violation of a statute. Scovill v.
Astoria recognized a tort for violation of a statute requiring that intoxicated persons who
present dangers to themselves or others be kept in protective custody. Courts just as
properly, and for varying reasons, often refuse to create new torts for violations of
statutory duties in other contexts.").
56. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 41-65 (discussing the concept of "the law" and what it
means).
57. See Colin S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 393, 399-400 (1981).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 410-11, 424.
60. See id. at 403-04.
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time as to what the law required. 61 Adjudication, therefore, had a
retroactivity problem. 62
Enter the Chenery litigation 63 and a moment in administrative
law when the issues of rules versus standards, rulemaking versus
adjudication, and the problem of retroactivity all coalesced. The
Chenery cases arose in the mid-twentieth century, in the aftermath of
the Great Depression, and in the early days of President Franklin
Roosevelt's "New Deal" legislative agenda. At issue was the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of

193 5 1

("PUHCA") which, despite

its oblique title, was perhaps the most controversial of the securities
laws passed by the New Deal Congress. 65 Although the PUHCA
touched on only one segment of the economy (the provision of
utilities such as water and electricity) and addressed itself only to one
aspect of this segment (the emergence of financially complicated
"holding" companies that owned controlling stock in public utilities),
the PUHCA was the New Deal securities law most often challenged
in court, at the center of the majority of all securities-law actions
reaching the Supreme Court between 1935 and 1955.1
The PUHCA was controversial because of its substantive
financial policy and because of the pervasiveness, under the statute,
of government's role in matters of private ordering. As a matter of
financial policy, the PUHCA required the significant restructuring of
all public utility holding companies, forcing them to shed "nonintegral" holdings (those unrelated to their core public utility
businesses), thereby limiting their operations "to a single integrated
public utility system."' In comparison to earlier provisions of the
61. See id. at 420-21.
62. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("Every case of
first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court
or by an administrative agency.").
63. See generally id. (sustaining an adjudicative order issued by the SEC and
challenged by Chenery Corporation); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80
(1943) (setting aside an adjudicative order issued by the SEC and challenged by Chenery
Corporation).
64. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803
(repealed 2005).
65. See Morris L. Forer, A Postscript to the Administration of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act: The Hydro-Electric System Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1007, 1007-08
(1959).
66. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal
Justices,95 VA. L. REv. 841, 865 (2009).
67. § 11(b)(1), 49 Stat. at 820 (repealed 2005); see also Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 204-05
(discussing operation of PUHCA section 11(e)). The purpose of this requirement was to
reduce the amount of overleveraging in which public utility holding companies had been
engaged. See generally Forer, supra note 65 (discussing the purpose and effects of the
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legislation that were struck during its congressional passage, in
particular a provision that would have eliminated these kinds of
holding companies altogether,' the integrated-holdings requirement
might have been viewed as relatively modest. At its core, it sought to
reduce opportunities for overleveraging and speculation that had
notoriously characterized the industry.69 But, in comparison to the
mechanisms of other New Deal securities laws, such as the disclosure
provisions in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934," the PUHCA was
attacked as an unprecedented intrusion of government power into the
market.71 Section 11 of the PUHCA authorized the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") to approve any "voluntary"
reorganization plans submitted by holding companies or, if none were
forthcoming, to hold adjudicatory hearings after which the SEC itself
could order particular reorganization measures.72 The PUHCA also
delegated rulemaking powers to the SEC, giving the agency power to
adopt rules to help with implementation of the statute.73 In light of
the substantial powers given the agency by the PUHCA, there were
frequent claims from the utility industry that the statute's "socialis[t]"
backers wanted to " 'nationalize' " the industry.74
At issue in the Chenery cases was an SEC adjudicative order
issued under section 11(e) disapproving parts of a reorganization plan
submitted by Christopher Chenery and other officers and directors of
a public utility holding company." Under this plan, preferredshares in
the "old" holding company, including preferred shares recently

PUHCA). In keeping with the spirit of speculation that led to the 1929 stock market crash,
these kinds of holding companies had frequently pledged as collateral their ownership
interests in public utilities (regulated businesses with guaranteed but unspectacular profit
margins) for loans that could in turn be invested in more flamboyant ventures possessing
greater potential for outsized, speculative gains. When the stock market crash took down
the speculative ventures, the holding companies defaulted on these loans and the lenders
foreclosed on the underlying collateral, the nation's supposedly "boring" public utility
companies themselves. Thus, an unexpected artifact of the stock market crash was the
indirect financial chaos it spawned even in safe sectors of the economy, including
industries providing such bedrock services as fresh water and electric power.
68. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 66, at 865-66.
69. See supra note 67.
70. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 66, at 865-67.
71. See id. at 866-67.
72. §§ 11(b), (e), 49 Stat. at 820-23 (repealed 2005).
73. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943) ("Had the Commission, acting upon its
experience and peculiar competence, promulgated a general rule of which its order here
was a particular application, the problem for our consideration would be very different.").
74. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 66, at 866-67 (quoting ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, The Politics of Upheaval, in THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 305,306 (1957)).
75. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81.
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purchased by Chenery and the other officers and directors, would be
redeemable for common (voting) shares in the "new," reorganized
company.76 It was acknowledged that management, in purchasing
preferred shares in the old company, had not been involved with any
kind of insider trading and had not otherwise violated any existing
securities law or regulation. It was also clear, however, that the new
emphasis on preferred shares was something of a switch. In earlier
proposals for reorganization, the Chenery group had proposed
exchanging common shares in the old company for common shares in
the new one.78 The reason for the change was wholly tactical: an
outside bidder for control of the reorganized company had emerged
and had been buying up common shares in the old company in an
effort to outmaneuver the Chenery group for post-reorganization
ownership.79 Although the SEC allowed the company to reorganize, it
forced the Chenery group to turn in its preferred shares almost for
cost (more or less getting back the price it paid for the preferred
shares), in contrast to the far greater profit the Chenery group would
have realized had it been able to redeem the preferred shares for
common shares in the new, reorganized company, and then sell those
common shares on the open market.so To justify this result, the SEC
in its section 11 order announced a principle under the PUHCA:
management of a public utility holding company cannot trade in the
company's securities during reorganization."
At first, any kind of retroactivity problem with the SEC's
rationale was not immediately apparent. In explaining its order, the
SEC stated that the agency was merely following what it believed to
be a well-known common law fiduciary principle, that management
can never trade in its own company's securities during any kind of
reorganization.' The problem with this explanation, however, is that

76. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81, 84--85.
77. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 197 ("It was also plain that there was no fraud or lack
of disclosure in making these purchases.").
78. See generally Roy A. Schotland, A Sporting Proposition-SEC v. Chenery, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 169, 176-78 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (discussing the
PUHCA and the dealings of the Chenery group, which gave rise to two Supreme Court
cases challenging the constitutionality of the SEC's order regarding the buying and selling
of public utility holding company securities by management at those companies during a
section 11 reorganization).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 197-98 ("[The SEC] felt that officers and directors of a
holding company in the process of reorganization under the [PUHCAJ were fiduciaries
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it was flatly incorrect. In the first of two actions by the Chenery group
against the SEC's action, the Supreme Court held (in an opinion
known as Chenery I) that there simply was not a general, common
law prohibition against management buying and selling such
securities, provided that full disclosure was made. 8 Having corrected
the agency's misunderstanding of the common law, the Court
remanded the Chenery group's proposal back to the agency for
reconsideration,' as it was the agency to which Congress had
delegated the task of supervising these kinds of reorganizations.
On remand, the SEC again disapproved the Chenery group's
proposed reorganization and again stated its belief that management
should not trade in securities of their own companies during a section
11 reorganization.85 This time, however, the agency located its notrading policy in the PUHCA itself." The agency explained that, as
the purpose of the PUHCA was to insulate consumers' public utility
service from turmoil created by financial manipulation within public
utility holding companies, it would effectuate the statute's goals to
prohibit just this sort of management trading during reorganization.87
After all, the SEC explained, the Chenery group's sudden decision to
elevate the value of preferred shares in the old company not only
lowered the relative value of (old) common shares held by the outside
bidders competing with the Chenery group for control of the
reorganized company, it also lowered the value of common shares
that might have been purchased and held by pension funds, widows,
and orphans who had sought to invest in (what they thought to be)
the relatively safe public utility sector." The PUHCA was enacted
because holding-company financiers had disastrously turned the

and were under a duty not to trade in the securities of that company during the
reorganization period."); Schotland, supra note 78, at 176-78.
83. See Chenery 1, 318 U.S. 80, 88, 90, 93-94 (1943); Schotland, supra note 78, at 17882.
84. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 95. In doing so, the Chenery I Court established one of
the core principles of modern administrative law: "that the courts could not uphold an
agency order on grounds other than those invoked by the agency." Kevin M. Stack, The
Constitutional Foundationsof Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 961 (2007); accord Chenery I,
318 U.S. at 95 (holding that "an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds
upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can
be sustained").
85. See Stack, supra note 84, at 961.
86. See id.
87. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 199-200.
88. Id. at 205 ("[T]he Commission felt that a management program of stock purchases
would give rise to the temptation and the opportunity to shape the reorganization
proceeding so as to encourage public selling on the market at low prices.").
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provision of basic public utilities into their own financial playground
(not unlike what would happen over half a century later in the Enron
scandal)." Therefore, from the SEC's point of view, it was important
that the Chenery group not be permitted to continue what the agency
saw as a "business-as-usual" approach of stock purchases during
reorganization that were designed to buttress management's strategic
positions at the expense of financial stability in the public utility
sector. 0
According to the Chenery group, however, this presented a
retroactivity problem. In a second Supreme Court challenge, the
Chenery group argued that even if the agency were correct about
management's actions being inconsistent with the PUHCA's statutory
purpose, the agency could not suddenly announce this new policy
after-the-fact and retroactively apply it to conduct that, when
undertaken, had not violated anything the agency had announced.9 1
Congress, after all, had delegated the SEC both adjudicatory power
under section 11 and the power to adopt broad implementing rules.'
It would be an abuse of discretion, the Chenery group argued, for the
agency to forego rulemaking as the vehicle for its new policy.93 Not
unlike arguments frequently made in the rules versus standards
debate, the Chenery group argued that law should be contained in
precise rules that put players on notice as to what was, or was not,
allowed.9 4
In Chenery II, the Supreme Court rejected the Chenery group's
argument, upheld the SEC, and announced as a principle of
administrative law that agencies are free to choose whether
policymaking under a statutory delegation is best made prospectively
through the agency's rulemaking powers or incrementally and
retroactively through the agency's adjudicatory authority.9 5 And,
although there has been interstitial movement in the courts of appeals
finding particular settings where the agency's choice might be
constrained,96 the Supreme Court has since reiterated that Chenery II
remains good law.'

89. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing comparisons to Enron).
90. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 205.
91. See id. at 199-200.
92. Id. at 201.
93. Id. at 199-200.
94. See id.
95. See Magill, supranote 53, at 1406.
96. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importanceof Facts,and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351, 365-76 (2000) (discussing several
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III. CHENERYII AND A DEFENSE OF Ex POST LAWMAKING

Assailing the retroactivity elements of the Court's decision,
Chenery II is sometimes pinpointed as a critical threat to the rule of
law and an open invitation to rank lawlessness." Thus, an article in
the "First Principles" series published by the Heritage Foundation9 9
states that "[t]he case also serves as a good illustration of the kind of
injustice the American Founders sought to avoid by instituting a
Constitution structured around the separation of powers and
grounded in the rule of law."'" This critique continues, "[I]n the
Chenery case, the company had no way of knowing what to do or not
to do in order to maintain its ownership and was forced to rely on
whatever ad hoc decision the administrators in the SEC felt like
making.""o' The article concludes, "Against such a scenario, the
advantages of the Founders' rule-of-law system are evident."1"
There are two obvious problems with such a sweeping critique of
Chenery II. First, and most obviously, the critique paints with such a
broad brush that it redacts the words of the actual Constitution and
instead inserts words and concepts that, apparently, the critique
wishes would have been used instead. Thus, it is worth recalling that
the Founders inserted into the actual Constitution an ex post facto
clause aimed only at the post-hoc imposition of criminalpenalties, an
3
interpretation of the Constitution adopted by the Calder v. Bull"o
circuit court decisions finding policymaking via agency adjudication to be improper when
the same agency had itself previously chosen rulemaking as the procedural mechanism).
97. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the Court reinforced the
vitality of Chenery II, holding that retroactivity concerns do not constrain an agency's
ability to make policy via adjudication even when doing so has the effect of reversing
previously announced policies. Id. at 295.
98. In his dissent to Chenery II, Justice Jackson called the case "the first instance in
which the administrative process is sustained by reliance on that disregard of law which
enemies of the process have always alleged to be its principal evil. It is the first
encouragement this Court has given to conscious lawlessness as a permissible rule of
administrative action." 332 U.S. at 217 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
99. RONALD J. PESTRITIO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE BIRTH OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: WHERE IT CAME FROM AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR LIMITED
GOVERNMENT 1 (Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/
2007/11/The-Birth-of-the-Administrative-State-Where-It-Came-From-and-What-ItMeans-for-Limited-Government (noting that "[n]othing written here is to be construed as
necessarily reflecting the views of the Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or
hinder the passage of any bill before Congress"). This article was published by the
Heritage Foundation in its "First Principles Series," which is described as "explor[ing] the
fundamental ideas of conservatism and the American political tradition." See id.
100. PESTRITTO, supra note 99, at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
103. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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Court in 1798 and followed ever since.'" That the Constitution would
not straightjacket the non-criminal-law policy choices of a new
democratic majority is hardly surprising given that it was written by
revolutionaries who had fought and died precisely with such a new
systemic transition in mind." Second, the critique similarly misreads
the country's history in the sixty years since Chenery II was decided.
The critique reads Chenery II as launching the country into an era of
retroactive policymaking via adjudication, an era of "ad hoc"
administrators operating outside the rule of law. In fact, the past fifty
years are routinely regarded as those where (ex ante) rulemaking has
"[t]riumph[ed]"10 6 over (ex post) adjudication."
In fact, both at its inception and since, Chenery II reflects an
important but much more occasional feature of our legal system: an
ability to ensure fidelity to legitimately (but newly adopted) statutory
regimes when they are challenged by conduct that could not have
been anticipated. In short, an element of retroactivity is necessary to
ensure the resilience of legal systems by allowing implementing
agencies to adapt (ex post) to unforeseen challenges. Indeed, the
Chenery II Court, in a frequently cited passage, emphasized exactly
that:
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the
administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems
which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general
rule.... In those situations, the agency must retain power to
deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the
administrative process is to be effective." 8
Moreover, this understanding of Chenery II explains even those
few instances in the courts of appeals (primarily a handful of cases in
the Ninth Circuit) where courts have since forced agencies to proceed

104. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
105. See Schauer, supra note 44, at 269 (noting that "the United States at the founding
... was engaged in a dramatic replacement of the English approach to political
institutions," even if in other ways for practical reasons they might choose to "continue[]
the substance, the procedure, and the institutions of the English common law").
106. Diver, supra note 57, at 409 (referring to the "[t]riumph of [clomprehensive
[rnationality"). "Beginning in the mid-1960's and accelerating rapidly during the early
years of the 1970's, a new consensus about policymaking began to emerge. The key
doctrinal shift was the enhanced emphasis on rulemaking as a method of formulating
policy." Id.
107. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 53, at 1403 n.69 (noting a consensus that rulemaking
was the preferred policymaking vehicle).
108. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
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only by rulemaking.'0 There, courts have emphasized that, when an
agency had itself previously known enough about a problem to
undertake rulemaking, it could not simply switch gears and instead
use after-the-fact adjudication."o Instead, it is when agencies face an
uncertain implementation landscape, one that necessarily puts
agencies in a "learning curve" posture,"' that agencies are on their
strongest ground in proceeding incrementally, and ex post, through
adjudicatory policymaking.
And there are other reasons for considering Chenery II to be less
the threat to rule-of-law values than is claimed by its attackers. There
is, for example, the fact that the Chenery II Court itself inserted a
type of escape valve: retroactive application of a policy would not be
allowed when its benefits were outweighed by unfairness to the
adjudicatee. As the Court stated,
But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of
producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to
legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is greater than
the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it
is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law." 2
Ignoring this feature of the opinion, attacks on Chenery II
sometimes suggest that the SEC actively misled the Chenery group.
Thus, one such critique states:
When it became clear that the SEC would allow preferred
stockholders to convert their shares of the old company into
109. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 96, at 367-72 (discussing cases where appellate courts
have held that an agency could not proceed by adjudication but rather must proceed by
rulemaking).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 394-95 (using the "learning curve" metaphor).
112. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203. In Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v.
NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972), for example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
applied this Chenery standard to a case involving a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board to require a company retroactively to reinstate and give back-pay to a
group of strikers after a Supreme Court decision that required such remedies. Id. at 393.
This case established a five-part test for determining whether an agency decision could
have retroactive effect:
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule
represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts
to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against
whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the
burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest
in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.
Id. at 390.
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shares of the newly reorganized company, the Chenery
Corporation went out and bought itself a large block of
preferred stock on the open market ... but the SEC explicitly
excluded Chenery from making such a conversion, thus
depriving Chenery of its ownership.113
In fact, neither the Chenery group nor any holding company
management group had ever sought, or received, advance approval
from the SEC to purchase shares of any kind during reorganization.
As the Chenery II Court stated, "Hence, we refuse to say that the
Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the
problem of management trading during reorganization,was forbidden

from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying
a new standard of conduct."114 Approximately thirty years later, in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,"1s the Court reiterated the validity of

Chenery II while also noting that it did not, nor was it intended to,
countenance any kind of active bad faith by government
administrators.1 16 Indeed, the Court emphasized just such an outer
limit to retroactive policymaking: "This is not a case in which some
new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions
which were taken in good faith reliance on Board pronouncements
... [n]or are fines or damages involved here."' 17 Both Chenery II and
Bell Aerospace clearly distinguish between what we might call "mere"
retroactivity, and the caricature of bad faith, bait-and-switch
governmental conduct that critics of Chenery II sometimes falsely
allege.
There remains, then, what might be the core claim of the
Chenery II critics, that "mere" retroactivity is always unjust and
inconsistent with the rule of law. This claim has normative, empirical,
and, in the specific case of the Chenery group, historical flaws.
Normatively, there is the problem of the arbitrary baseline. If reliance

113. PESTRrrO, supra note 99, at 2.
114. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
115. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court upheld the National
Labor Relations Board's decision to change its definition of "employees" to include
"buyers" in an adjudication, but not to punish the company retroactively for having
refused to negotiate with a union of buyers before the rule was changed. Id. at 294-95.
116. Id. at 294. The Bell Aerospace Court even extended Chenery II to allow agencies
to change policies when new facts require it, so long as it was not unjust to do so. Id. ("The
possible reliance of industry on the Board's past decisions with respect to buyers does not
require a different result. It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing
from such reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from
reconsidering the issue in an adjudicative proceeding.").

117. Id.
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based on past law is always to be protected, what of the Constitution
itself and the ensuing laws passed by the newly formed federal and
state governments, could they not be legitimately enforced when they
upset prior "Tory" expectations legitimately formed during the thenlegal colonial regime? Or, fast-forwarding through the country's
history, is the rule of law so demanding that, when the Thirteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1865 prohibiting slavery, all existing
master-slave relationships had to be "grandfathered in," lest we upset
reliance interests formed under the antebellum slave laws? As
Professor Harold Krent notes, "[r]etroactive lawmaking can comport
with democratic ideals by allowing a current majority to be free from
the controlling grasp of majorities past."' Thus, under the Due
Process Clause, the Court has always required mere "rationality"
when economic legislation adjusts "the burdens and benefits of
economic life" even when the legislation "upsets otherwise settled
expectations ... [or] impose[s] a new duty or liability based on past
acts."" 9 Similarly, under the Takings Clause the Court has never
required compensation for all so-called "regulatory takings," but only
as a general matter for those that go "too far."120 As Justice Holmes
famously stated in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,12 1 the case widely
credited with creating the idea of "regulatory takings" in the first
place, "Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." 122 Given this normative justification,
it is little surprise that, as an empirical matter, the Court has
consistently upheld retroactive legislation against claims by those it
affects that it violates the rule of law. 123

118. Krent, supra note 37, at 2146. Indeed, even if one takes the less rosy public-choice
view of legislation-that some laws reflect not the public interest but the influence of
special interests-then the possibility that such laws can be undone by subsequent "publicspirited" legislation raises the cost (and thereby dilutes the effectiveness) of rent-seeking
and political capture. Id. at 2145.
119. Usery v. Turner Elhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1976).
120. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978).
121. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
122. Id. at 413.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 34 (1994) (limiting availability of
deduction for proceeds of sales of stock to employee stock ownership plans); General
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (upholding retroactive enactments
designed to improve Michigan's compensation benefits law); United States v. Sperry
Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1989) (reallocating litigation costs); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 734 (1984) (imposing sanctions on employers who
withdrew from pension plans); Usery, 428 U.S. at 6 (imposing liability on mine employers
for employee disabilities due to black lung disease); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
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Indeed, the historical setting of Chenery II illustrates precisely
why the SEC's actions as to the Chenery group's preferred-shares
gambit during reorganization was both understandable and
defensible, and not the result of bureaucratic whim. The Chenery case
arose under a statute, the PUHCA, that focused specifically on one
type of corporate form, the public utility holding company, that had
played an outsized role in the country's economic history. 12 4 In the
early years of the twentieth century, as it became clear that
centralized power plants possessed economy-of-scale advantages over
more localized and distributed generation strategies, public utility
holding companies emerged as a type of centralized financing
mechanism with advantageous access to capital needed for the
breathtaking pace of the country's electrification.'" Although
"[e]ngineers and technically trained managers dominated the early
history of the major holding companies,"' 26 "during the stock-market
boom of the 1920's the utility holding company became an instrument
of high finance that ... [at the time had] no parallel in the entire

history of American business-not even in the earlier history of the
railroads." 127 In particular, utility holding companies came to be
known for pyramid structures in which "preferred" shares were used
to concentrate favorable ownership and dividend treatment to the
relatively few owners of arcane, specially created holding companies
over the vast majority of "common" stock holders in the underlying
public utilities (the bottom of the pyramid), who had been led to
believe in the safety of their investment in "electricity."" It was after
the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic depression
exposed the weakness of the highly leveraged scheme that public
utility holding companies had become, that the PUHCA was
passed,129 to break up the "reckless promoters" of "the power

F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988) (imposing retroactive liability on handlers and transporters of
hazardous substances).
124. This narrative is taken largely from an excellent historical summary: Richard D.
Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After
the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 53-57 (2005).
125. Id. at 57.
126. Id. at 54 (citing THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION
IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930, at 393 (1983)).
127. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE NATIONAL POWER POLICIES
24 (1972).
128. See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 124, at 53 (noting especially that utility and
early holding company investors had been told, "if the light shines, you know your money
is safe") (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 73-78.
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trust.""'o Thus, when the Chenery group, during the mandatory
PUHCA reorganization, traded in its own securities (and through the
mechanism of "preferred" shares no less) in a way that benefited
itself as management but at the risk of lowering the value of the old
common stock held by "regular" investors, the SEC found that the
practice violated the broader purposes of the statute, a legal
conclusion the Chenery II Court had no trouble upholding.131 Given
the legal appropriateness of the agency's action, (not a matter simply
of bureaucratic whim), it's hard to see how the Chenery group was
treated unfairly by the Commission's relatively solomonic order: the
reorganization was approved and the Chenery group was forced to
redeem its preferred shares for cost, getting back all of the money it
had paid for its preferred sharesl32 (and even awarded "cost plus
dividends" for the time value since purchase).133
It is not difficult to generalize on the wisdom of Chenery II and
the value of the law preserving for itself the ability, ex post, to
respond to unforeseen circumstances. Consider simply the country's
subsequent history with energy markets. Near the end of the
twentieth century, a growing faith in market competition began to
replace the suspicion of market manipulation that had underlain the
PUHCA.1" By the 1990s, under new statutes such as the Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978135 and the Energy Policy Act of
1992,136 new energy regulators had undone "much of the work
accomplished by the SEC in breaking up the holding companies ...
[and n]ew utility conglomerates emerged, such as Enron." 137 In 1997,
Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's president and chief operating officer,
testified before Congress: "I am absolutely certain, Mr. Chairman,

130. Id. at 68 (quoting President Franklin Roosevelt).
131. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947) ("[TIhe Commission's action is based
upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted it by Congress.").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 198.
134. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in
Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (2005) ("[T]he norms governing transactions
prior to the Enron and WorldCom scandals included ... a dominance of market
economism and shareholder wealth maximization.").
135. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
136. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 16, 38, and 42 U.S.C.).
137. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 66, at 913-14; see also Cudahy & Henderson,
supra note 124, at 85 (stating that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 "created a new category
of power plants ... that were exempt from the PUHCA's corporate ownership and
geographic provisions").
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that if you reconvene this panel ten years from now, all of us will
wonder aloud why we ever let the monopoly persist for so long."l 38
On August 14, 2001, Skilling resigned from Enron, just months before
Enron itself filed for bankruptcy, one of the largest bankruptcies in
U.S. history.' In the various postmortems, a consensus emerged that,
among other things, Skilling and Enron had deliberately camouflaged
Enron's lack of profitability through an arcane and complicated web
of special-interest companies that kept Enron's actual debts off of its
balance sheet.'" Skilling claimed that, in creating these special
entities, he had technically followed all applicable accounting rules.141
But, like the SEC using the tool of ex post adjudicatory policymaking
to respond to a new situation in Chenery II, federal prosecutors
successfully used the default admonition against "fraud" in the
federal securities laws, which itself has elements of an "ex post"
standard (in the "standards versus rules" sense), to successfully
prosecute Skilling and his fellow Enron conspirators.142 Although
Skilling recently succeeded in the Supreme Court in having some of
these criminal counts reversed because they were based on an
impermissibly vague (and novel) interpretation of the federal "honest
services" statute,143 the Court left untouched the ability of the legal
system to use the "standards-based" fraud statutes to respond ex post
to the violation of society's norms against unfair dealing, despite the
use of novel financial mechanisms.'"
138. Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 124, at 88 (quoting Competitive Change in the
Electric Power Industry: What Are the Issues Involved in Competition? Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 105th Cong. 11 (1997) (testimony of Jeffrey
Skilling, President and Chief Operating Officer, Enron Corporation)).
139. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
140. See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 124, at 95 ("Prior to its collapse, the worst
thing that analysts had to say about Enron was that they could not understand the
company's business model. As early as 1996, some analysts acknowledged that Enron's
trading transactions were so complex that they represent a black box, making it difficult to
calculate the company's future profitability.") (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose
Entities in CorporateStructure, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 1315-17 (2002) (noting that even
sophisticated investors could not understand Enron's use of SPEs).
141. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934.
142. Id. at 2911 (noting that the jury convicted Skilling of nineteen counts of fraud).
143. Id. at 2933.
144. Citing to the Brief for the United States, the Court said:
If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing "undisclosed selfdealing by a public official or private employee," it would have to employ
standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process
concerns. The Government proposes a standard that prohibits the "taking of
official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial interests
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Moving beyond the energy markets at issue in both Chenery II
and Enron, it is possible to reconceptualize the "rules versus
standards" and "rulemaking versus adjudication" debates, and make
an especially strong case for retroactivity when the law faces the
problem of dynamic noncompliance, also sometimes known as
"regulatory arbitrage" or "regulatory gaming."14 5 The problem is
simple to understand. If the "rule of law" requires that the only valid
legal system is one comprising a myriad of detailed and fully specified
rules, subrules, exceptions, and caveats, it would paradoxically
guarantee its own failure. The problem is especially well recognized
in the tax literature, for the U.S. tax code is (notoriously) known to
resemble just such a highly specified system.'" Yet it is precisely
because the system is so highly specified that it has spawned a virtual
industry of aggressive "tax planning" designed "to manipulate the
rules endlessly to produce results clearly not intended by the
drafters."147 For generations of tax lawyers, the motto for this sort of
regulatory gaming is taken from the language Judge Learned Hand
used in Helvering v. Gregory48 : "Any one may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose

while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty,"
so long as the employee acts with a specific intent to deceive and the undisclosed
conduct could influence the victim to change its behavior. That formulation,
however, leaves many questions unanswered. How direct or significant does the
conflicting financial interest have to be? To what extent does the official action
have to further that interest in order to amount to fraud? To whom should the
disclosure be made and what information should it convey? These questions and
others call for particular care in attempting to formulate an adequate criminal
prohibition in this context.
Id. at 2933 n.44 (internal citations omitted).
For an interesting account that, in fact, the Enron case is not a good example of
"standards" coming to the rescue of a "rule-based" accounting system, see generally
William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003).
145. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009) (exploring the dynamics and effects of regulatory
gaming); Frank Partnoy, FinancialDerivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
CORP. L. 211 (1997) (explaining regulatory arbitrage and relating it to derivatives
regulation).
146. See Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25 AKRON
TAX J. 1, 10 (2010) ("With over 1,000 forms and nearly 100,000 pages of Code and
Treasury regulations, the U.S. tax system can be fairly categorized as a thicket of
complicated rules [and] the current U.S. tax system is a cumbersome creation of
stupefying complexity.") (citation omitted).
147. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860
(1999).
148. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."l4 9 From this starting point,
there has since spawned an enormous literature on tax evasion, tax
avoidance, and tax shelters, a welter of "[m]anipulation ... [that is]
inefficient, loses revenue, and demoralizes others."150 Yet regulatory
gaming is hardly limited to tax law. Antitrust law has grappled with
attempts by pharmaceutical companies to engage in "product
hopping," whereby "branded companies" (those still enjoying patent
protection before generic substitutes are allowed) make "repeated
changes in a drug's formulation to prevent generic substitution rather
than to improve the efficacy of the drug product.""' The criminal law
had to respond to attempts by the manufacturers of designer drugs to
stay one molecule ahead of laws specifying which particular drugs
were classified as "controlled substances." 5 2 Securities law has to
contend with the unintended side effect of regulations imposing costs
on nonderivatives transactions, which "create an incentive for parties
to structure economically equivalent derivatives transactions that
avoid the reach of the regulation.""'
My point is both normative and descriptive. Normatively, the
problem of regulatory gaming requires some ability of the law to
adapt by acting retroactively, ironically to preserve the resiliency of
legal systems in the face of rational but potentially debilitating
regulatory gaming. Professor Partnoy reaches this conclusion in the
case of complex financial derivative transactions, stating that
"[d]erivatives participants exposed to common law liabilityespecially for fraud-may not be able to avoid such ex post regulation
through regulatory arbitrage."'" Similarly, in tax law, the academic

149. Id. at 810.
150. Weisbach, supra note 147, at 860. See generally Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the
Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance, 25 CARDoZO L. REV. 953,
954 n.1 (2004) (citing literature and contrasting the view that "tax evasion" is a crime
whereas "tax avoidance" is "behavior by the taxpayer that is aimed at reducing tax liability
but that does not constitute a criminal offense," with the observation of President Franklin
Roosevelt that "tax avoidance means that you hire a $250,000-fee lawyer, and he changes
the word 'evasion' into the word 'avoidance.' ") (citations omitted).
151. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 145, at 687.
152. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous,
96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 138 (1997) (suggesting that criminal law listing prohibited
substances by chemical composition led drug sellers to alter the composition "ever so
slightly" so that the drug produces the same effect on the users but is not on the prohibited
substance list).
153. Partnoy, supra note 145, at 227-28 (discussing "regulatory arbitrage" in securities
law).
154. Id. at 253-54.
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literature regularly concludes that regulatory gaming can only be
solved by augmenting tax rules with "a principles-based" regime,' 5
"anti-abuse" metarules,15 6 or deliberately "fuzzy" rules.'57 And
antitrust scholars report that antitrust law, especially when used by
the government as opposed to private litigants, should "[move] away
from rules (ex ante, limited factor liability determinants) and toward
standards (ex post, multi-factor liability determinants)" to avoid
problems of regulatory avoidance and arbitrage.' 8 Not surprisingly,
the same literature posits the descriptive claim as well, that in all of
these fields, the law has increasingly and deliberately found it
necessary in fact to preserve options for ex post lawmaking to guard
against regulatory gaming. 15 9 At a broad level, regulatory gaming is
just one example of the type of unexpected activity, which the law
must often confront, that the Chenery Court acknowledged in
providing regulators with flexibility in their responses.
CONCLUSION

Properly understood, Chenery II is neither revolutionary nor
unique. Rather, it reflects a consistent strand in our jurisprudence
that weaves throughout administrative law, the common law,
constitutional jurisprudence under the Takings and Due Process
Clauses, and specific trends in regulatory design in fields as diverse as
environmental law, securities law, tax law, and antitrust. Professor
Maria Savasta-Kennedy opened this symposium on resilience and
adaptation by noting how buildings in California have design features
that let them absorb seismic shocks, both large and small." Chenery
II and the other examples of ex post lawmaking buttressing our
jurisprudence are each as sensible, useful, and justified. And there is
an understanding throughout American law that these features are
useful precisely because of the resilience and adaptiveness they offer.

155. See Holmes, supra note 146, at 2.
156. Weisbach, supra note 147, at 860-62.
157. Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other Comments on Formalism in
the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 915, 915 (1999).
158. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 49,49 (2007).
159. See supra notes 144-53.
160. See Maria Savasta-Kennedy, Introduction to the North Carolina Law Review
Symposium, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems, 89 N.C L. REV. 1365, 1365
(2011).
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